Master and Servant--The Simple Tool Doctrine by Briggs, William
Kentucky Law Journal
Volume 42 | Issue 1 Article 10
1953
Master and Servant--The Simple Tool Doctrine
William Briggs
University of Kentucky
Follow this and additional works at: https://uknowledge.uky.edu/klj
Part of the Construction Law Commons
Right click to open a feedback form in a new tab to let us know how this document benefits
you.
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at UKnowledge. It has been accepted for inclusion in Kentucky Law Journal by
an authorized editor of UKnowledge. For more information, please contact UKnowledge@lsv.uky.edu.
Recommended Citation
Briggs, William (1953) "Master and Servant--The Simple Tool Doctrine," Kentucky Law Journal: Vol. 42 : Iss. 1 , Article 10.
Available at: https://uknowledge.uky.edu/klj/vol42/iss1/10
KENTUcKY LAw JouXRNAL
theory. Surely the legislatures intend by their enactments to simplify
rather than complicate the problem.
Conclusion
Under all three theories intention is a controlling factor and it
would seem that the best theory is the one which affords the best
opportunity to determine this intention accurately. Intention is pri-
marily a question of fact, and the average person using the joint bank
account probably intends to give his co-depositor a legal power to
draw upon the account, and the legal right of survivorship. Since it
is intended that the co-depositor should be able to demand payment
from the bank, it is inconsistent with this intention to say that the
depositor merely intended a testamentary disposition. It is also incon-
sistent with this intention to say that the depositor made the account
for his own convenience, or to say that survivorship was intended but
no right to make withdrawals during the life of the depositor was in-
tended. It is not inconsistent with this intention to say that the bene-
ficiary of the contract, or the donee of the gift, has the rights and
interests provided for in the agreement.
It is submitted that the contract theory will lead to the proper re-
sult in the majority of cases, and should be followed, because in apply-
ing it the courts do not need to use the historical and sometimes con-
fusing principles of gift intention. Nor are they confined to any pre-
scribed statutory provision. They can look at the agreement, and base
their decision on general contract principles. Under any of the theories,
however, the desired result of giving effect to the true intentions of the
parties will be reached if the written agreement or signature card is
held to be conclusive. Holding the parties to the written manifesta-
tion of intention works no hardship on either of them, because if they
intend otherwise, they can so express themselves to the bank in
writing. Under any other rule there is great risk that virtually every
joint deposit will result in litigation.
JAmms T. YOtNGBLOOD
MASTER AND SERVANT-THE SIMPLE TOOL DOCTRINE
In a recent North Dakota case, Olson v. Kern Temple, Ancient
Arabic Order of the Mystic Shrine,1 the plaintiff, a member of a fra-
ternal organization, volunteered to assist in decorating a pavilion for
the use of the organization and was injured when he fell from a loose
' 77 N. D. 365, 43 N.W. 2d 385 (1950).
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step of the ladder furnished for his use by the organization. The de-
fendant fraternal organization was held not liable because the step-
ladder was a simple tool within the simple tool doctrine.
This case was adjudicated without the interference of a workmen's
compensation statute or an employers' liability act, and thus permits
an opportunity to consider the scope and merits of the simple tool
doctrine without their influence.2 This doctrine developed as an ex-
ception or a defense to the well established common law rule that
whenever the employer undertakes to supply the employee with tools,
he is under a duty to exercise reasonable care to furnish and maintain
them in a safe condition.3 The doctrine was stated in this manner in
the principal case:
Where the tool or appliance is simple in construction
and a defect therein is discernible without special skill or knowledge,
and the employee is as well qualified as the employer to detect the
defect and appraise the danger resulting therefrom the employee may
not recover damages from his employer for an injury due to such a
defect that is unknown to the employer.'
The theory behind the doctrine is that the employee is in as good a
position as the employer to discover the defect in a simple tool.5 The
doctrine is usually employed in one of three ways. Some courts hold
that an employee who is injured while using a defective tool is con-
tributorily negligent.0 Other authorities state that the foundation of
2The doctrine is not applicable to cases arising under the Federal Employers'
Liability Act, 53 Stat. 1404 (1939), 45 U.S.C. see. 51 et seq. (1946); Pitt v.
Pennsylvania R. Co. 66 F. Supp. 443 (1946), affirmed 161 F. 2d 733 (4th Cir.
1947); nor in all probability to cases arising under the Jones Act, 41 Stat. 1007
(1920), 46 U.S.C. see. 688 (1946); see Jacob v. City of New York, 315 U.S. 752
1941). In a suit brought under a workmen's compensation statute, it would
seem that the doctrine would never be employed since negligence is not an issue.
But in a suit against an employer who has rejected the provisions of a workmen's
compensation statute whether the doctrine is applicable may depend upon thejurisdiction. See 91 A.L.R. 781 (1934). Generally as a consequence of rejection
of the statute, the employer loses his common law defenses to negligence. Thus
in a jurisdiction which applies the doctrine as a defense it would follow that the
doctrine would be inapplicable. Kentucky takes this view, see Nugent Sand Co.
v. Howard, 227 Ky. 91, 11 S.W. 2d 985 (1929). If the doctrine is applied as an
exception to the employer's common law duty to furnish safe tools, then theo-
retically the abolition of the common law defenses should not affect the avail-
ability of the doctrine and some courts have so held. Newbern v. Great Atlantic
& Pacific Tea Co., 69 F. 2d 523 (4th Cir. 1934).
For application of the common law rule, see Meny v. Carlson, 6 N. J. 82,
77 A. 2d 245 (1950); Prefontaine v. Great Northern By. Co., 51 N.D. 158, 199
N.W. 480 (1924); Swaim v. Chicago R. I. & P. fy. Co., 187 Ia. 466, 174 N.W.
384 (1919); 35 Am. Jun. 569 (1941); 56 C.J.S. 900 (1948).
'Olson v. Kem Temple, Ancient Arabic Order of the Mystic Shrine, 77 N.D.
365, -, 43 N.W. 385, 387 (1950).5 Newbern v. Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co., 68 F. 2d 523 (4th Cir. 1934);
Vanderpool v. Partridge, 79 Neb. 165, 112 N.W. 318 (1907); 35 Al. JuR. 574
(1941).
" Nolen v. Halpin-Dwyer Coast. Co., 225 Mo. A. 224, 29 S.W. 2d 215 (1930).
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the doctrine lies in the defense of assumption of risk.7 Still another line
of cases takes the position that the doctrine is an exception to the
common law duty of the employer to exercise care in furnishing and
maintaining tools for the employee's use-that there can be no negli-
gence because there is no duty.8
Nearly every American jurisdiction has utilized the doctrine,9 but
there is a great lack of uniformity in its application. 10 Only a few
courts have abandoned the doctrine,"' but many have shown a tend-
ency to reduce its scope by finding it inapplicable to certain situations;
for example, where the tool was being used by another than the in-
jured servant,12 or where the defect was not observable or discoverable
by an inspection such as a workman using it could reasonably be ex-
pected to make.13
It would seem that the court was dealing with this latter situation
in the principal case.' 4 The defect in the ladder was a step that tipped
or tilted when the plaintiff stepped on it. It was not shown that the
officers of the defendant organization had knowledge of the particular
defect; but testimony indicated that they knew the ladder was fifteen
Neeley v. Chicago Great Western R. Co., 14 S.W. 2d 972 (Mo. 1928); Ringer v.St. Louis & S. F. R. Co., 85 Kan. 167, 116 Pac. 212 (1911); Holt v. Chicago M.
and St. P. Ry. Co., 94 Wis. 596, 69 N.W. 352 (1896).
"Vandalia R. Co. v. Adams, 43 Ind. App. 664, 88 N.E. 353 (1909); NugentSand Co. v. Howard, 227 Ky. 91, 11 S.W. 2d 985 (1928); Phillip Carey Roofing
and Mfg. Co. v. Black, 129 Tenn. 30, 164 S.W. 1183 (1914).8Newbern v. Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co., 68 F. 2d 523 (4th Cir. 1934);
Allen Gravel Co. v. Yarborough, 133 Miss. 652, 98 So. 117 (1923); Koschman v.
Ash, 98 Minn. 312, 108 N.W. 514 (1900).
956 C.J.S. 1208 (1948).
o This becomes obvious upon examining the materials of almost any authority;
e.g., 3 LABATr, MASTER AND SnvANr 2476 (2d ed., 1913); see also notes 6, 7 and
8 supra and notes 12 and 13 infra.
u Quanah, A. & P. By. Co. v. Gray, 63 F. 2d 410 (5th Cir. 1933); Drake v.
San Antonio & A. P. Ry., 99 Tex. 240, 89 S.W. 407 (1905). In Fischer v. City
of Cape Girardeau, 345 Mo. 122, 131 S.W. 2d 521 (1939), the court said that
the doctrine as applied elsewhere is not the law in Missouri and that the rule is
merely one of contributory negligence, while in Missouri Pac. R. Co. v. Spangler,
140 F. 2d 917 (8th Cir. 1944), the court decided that the doctrine does not apply
absolutely in Arkansas. In a note, 30 OREGON L. REv. 269 (1951), it is said that
Oregon courts will not apply the doctrine my name although similar results are
predicted by application of the defense of assumption of risk.
=Shepherd v. City of Chattanooga, 168 Tenn. 153, 76 S.W. 2d 322 (1934).
'Southern By. v. Cowan, 52 Ga. App. 360, 183 S.E. 331 (1936). Other
situations where the courts have found the doctrine inapplicable are: Thomas v.
National Concrete Const. Co., 166 Ky. 512, 179 S.W. 439 (1915) (the tool was
not being used in the ordinary and usual way); Ft. Smith and W. R. Co. v.
Holcombe, 59 Okla. 54, 158 Pac. 633 (1916) (the master had knowledge of the
defect and the servant had not); Cole v. Seaboard Airline By. Co. 199 N. C. 389,
154 S.E. 682 (1930) (the employee had no opportunity to inspect the tool); Mid-
dleton v. Faulkner et al, 180 Miss. 737, 178 So. 583 (1938) (the servant was of
immature years and was without experience).
S 4Broderick in his dissent places this case in a different situation where the
doctrine is said not to be applicable-where the master has actual knowledge of
the defective condition and the servant does not.
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or sixteen years old, was rickety, and the top steps could not be safely
used unless someone was steadying the ladder. Prior to its use the
plaintiff shook the ladder to be sure that it was balanced on all four
legs, and the ladder appeared safe. After the plaintiff had been stand-
ing on the lower steps of the ladder for about an hour, he stepped onto
a higher step near the top of the ladder. The step tilted, and the
plaintiff fell, injuring himself. The majority of the court took the
position that the ladder was a simple tool within the doctrine, and
therefore the plaintiff could not recover. It would seem that the em-
ployment of the doctrine in this case places too much weight upon one
factor-the simplicity of the tool. Should the fact that the tool was
simple in construction override the fact that the plaintiff had done all
that could be expected of a reasonable man by way of inspection?
Does the decision perhaps demonstrate the danger in using the doc-
trine since it can be so readily applied to situations where it should be
held inapplicable?
In view of the fact that the real problem should be whether the
employer has breached his duty to use ordinary care in furnishing
and maintaining safe tools, it seems unnecessary to place simple tools
in a separate category. 15 The problem can be solved more justly and
with less confusion in most cases by applying ordinary common law
principles of negligence weighed against the affirmative defenses of
contributory negligence and assumption of risk.10 Judge Christianson
in his dissenting opinion to the principal case makes this observation:
Obviously the character of a tool is an important matter
for consideration in determining whether the employer has exercised
due care in furnishing a reasonably safe and suitable tool to the em-
ployee for the performance of his work. But it is one thing to say
that the character of the tool is a matter to be considered in de-
termining whether the employer exercised due care in the performance
of his duty to furnish his employee with a safe tool and quite another
to say that because a tool is simple the employer has no obligation to
furnish a safe tool, as has been held in some of the cases in applying
the so-called simple tool doctrine.'7
In Quanah, A. & P. Ry. Co. v. Gray, 63 F. 2d 410, 413 (5th Cir. 1933) the
court said: "We have reached the conclusion that there is no reasonable basis
for the statement of a 'simple tool doctrine' as a doctrine or rule of law, either
relieving the defendant as matter of law of all duty of inspection, or establishing
as matter of law its affirmative defenses, where injuries from simple tools are in
question." See Pnossin, HANDBOOx OF mn LAW OF ToRTs 384 (1941).
" In 3 LABATT, MASTM AND SERVANT 2484 (2d ed. 1913) there is this state-
ment: ". . . it is illogical and unreasonable to say that the master is free from the
obligation of using ordinary care merely because the appliance to be furnished is a
simple tool, but the better view is that the appliance being a simple tool, and
entirely understood by the servant, the latter's obligations to his master and to
himself are increased; and cases involving injuries from simple tools furnish a
broader scope for the application of the various affirmative defenses .. "
"Olson v. Kem Temple, Ancient Arabic Order of the Mystic Shrine, 77 N.D.
365, -, 43 N.W. 385, 395 (1950).
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Judge Christianson's approach seems to be similar to that taken by
the Arkansas Court when it said: "Ordinarily, the simplicity of a tool
is but a circumstance to be considered by the jury in determining the
duty resting upon the master in furnishing it and of the servant in
using it."'8 It should be noted that the opinion of Judge Christianson
and that of the Arkansas Court both refer to the character or simplicity
of the tool as being one factor to be considered in determining the
duties owed by the employer while Labatt in his treatise says that
cases involving injuries from simple tools furnish a broader basis for
use of the affirmative defenses. 19 It is submitted that whether one
allows the simple tool factor to decrease the duty of the employer or
increase the applicability of the affirmative defenses, the pragmatic
effect will not vary greatly. The important consideration is to discard
the notion that the character of the tool is the deciding factor, and
this seems less likely to be accomplished where the doctrine is retained.
It is not impossible for a court to solve the problem fairly in a
jurisdiction which recognizes the doctrine, but sound decisions are
more difficult to achieve. The doctrine places undue importance upon
the character of the tool, and a court in considering the application of
the doctrine also has the difficult job of ferreting out the variety of
situations where the courts have found the doctrine inapplicable. It is
all too easy for courts, while worrying over the many details of ap-
plication of the doctrine, to fall into the trap of relegating what should
be determining factors into secondary positions, as perhaps was done
in the principal case.
WmLL A BRIcGs
' Norton and Wheeler Stave Co. v. Wright, 194 Ark. 115, 106 S.W. 2d 178,
181 (1937).
" Supra note 16.
